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SHOULD OPTIMAL DESIGNERS WORRY ABOUT CONSIDERATION?
MINHUA LONG AND W. ROSS MORROW
Abstract. Consideration set formation using non-compensatory screening rules is a vi-
tal component of real purchasing decisions with decades of experimental validation. Mar-
keters have recently developed statistical methods that can estimate quantitative choice
models that include consideration set formation via non-compensatory screening rules.
But is capturing consideration within models of choice important for design? This paper
reports on a simulation study of a vehicle portfolio design when households screen over
vehicle body style built to explore the importance of capturing consideration rules for op-
timal designers. We generate synthetic market share data, fit a variety of discrete choice
models to the data, and then optimize design decisions using the estimated models. Model
predictive power, design “error”, and profitability relative to ideal profits are compared as
the amount of market data available increases. We find that even when estimated com-
pensatory models provide relatively good predictive accuracy, they can lead to sub-optimal
design decisions when the population uses consideration behavior; convergence of com-
pensatory models to non-compensatory behavior is likely to require unrealistic amounts of
data; and modeling heterogeneity in non-compensatory screening is more valuable than
heterogeneity in compensatory trade-offs. This supports the claim that designers should
carefully identify consideration behaviors before optimizing product portfolios. We also
find that higher model predictive power does not necessarily imply better design decisions;
that is, different model forms can provide “descriptive” rather than “predictive” informa-
tion that is useful for design.
1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional discrete choice models [1, 2] have been applied in design for market systems
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] in the past decade. Generally, the choice model serves to forecast
demand as a function of product features, thus enabling design decisions that maximize
forecast profits. These conventional choice models share the assumption that individu-
als choose by processing and weighing all attributes, for all alternatives, when maximiz-
ing utility. According to this assumption choice is a compensatory decision making pro-
cess where tradeoffs can take place across all features and all alternatives: in particular,
shortcomings in one attribute can always be compensated by making others sufficiently
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attractive. Empirical studies have shown the opposite: people often use “fast and fru-
gal” non-compensatory rules to eliminate options when faced with task complexity [11],
time pressure [12], information cost [13] and memory requirements [14]. The use of such
heuristics−decision rules that ignore information−is widespread and beneficial [15]. This
paper investigates the importance of including consideration behavior when making design
decisions.
The awareness of the use of non-compensatory rules among consumers has changed
the traditional concept of the choice set in choice modeling [16]. Instead of assuming
only a universal choice set with all alternatives, consideration-sets [17, 18] have become a
topic of active research. Consideration-sets are subsets of the universal set that are cho-
sen by individuals following internal, non-compensatory rules. Building on early research
on non-compensatory decision models [19, 20, 21], non-compensatory rules proposed for
consideration set formation include conjunctive, disjunctive, subset conjunctive, and even
lexicographic rules; see [22] for further background and examples. Accepting considera-
tion implies that identification of the structure and distribution of screening rules is an
important empirical task that much recent research addresses, as reviewed in Section 2.
But is modeling consideration important when making design decisions? Marketers have
only shown the advantage of modeling consideration through improvement in model predic-
tive accuracy, though this has been accomplished across a wide variety of product categories
including cameras, batteries, automobiles, cellphones, and computers [23, 24, 18, 25, 26];
e.g., see Table 1 below. Simulation experiments have illustrated the limits of classical com-
pensatory models including the multinomial and random coefficient (Mixed) Logit models
when modeling non-compensatory choice behavior [27, 28, 29]. Existing engineering stud-
ies demonstrate how design can include consideration in choice model structure, and how
this might affect decisions [30, 31], but have not compared the performance of compen-
satory and non-compensatory models when both types of models are estimated on the
same data with a comparable level of system knowledge. Even if compensatory models
do not represent non-compensatory choice behavior well, could they still suggest product
designs similar to designs that are optimal for true, non-compensatory behavior? If the
non-compensatory behavior is modeled directly, how much closer could a firm get to true
optimal designs? What is the difference of the value of the chosen designs, e.g. profits,
between designs chosen using compensatory versus non-compensatory models?
We describe a simulation study that examines how well compensatory models perform
in 1) recovering non-compensatory choice behavior, 2) suggesting design decisions near to
ideal optimal decisions, and 3) suggesting designs that capture all potential profitability.
Our “synthetic data” [32] simulation experiment has the following steps:
1:: Define a synthetic population with known “true” choice behavior;
2:: Simulate responses of this population to a sequence of “markets” with randomly
generated product profiles;
3:: Estimate compensatory and non-compensatory models from the responses and
validate predictive power;
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4:: Optimize design decisions with the estimated models and evaluate design profit
using the “true” behavior.
Synthetic data experiments are an effective method for detecting choice model properties
in specific situations or when testing the validity of an estimation approach [29, 33, 34, 32].
We extend this paradigm to also include the quality and value of decisions made using
estimated models, the ultimate goal of choice modeling within engineering design. The
synthetic data experiment allows us to measure the divergence of design decisions and
outcomes from ideal values that can be obtained only by knowing the true behavioral
model. We describe an “econometric-style” (revealed preference) experiment that uses
aggregate share data to estimate choice models. An alternative perspective, more common
in marketing, samples the population for respondents to choice and/or consideration-based
conjoint surveys (stated preference). Both perspectives have value, as is discussed in [2],
pg.152. Both types of models have also been used in design [4, 35].
Several observations are enabled by the experiment. As would be expected, modeling
consideration with a non-compensatory model results in the best design and pricing de-
cisions when the population exhibits matching non-compensatory behavior. Conventional
compensatory models can reasonably support profitable design decisions, however, with
several caveats: conventional models might require more data than is reasonably available
to capture non-compensatory behaviors, can suggest simplistic product portfolios, can be
sensitive to sample variance in the training data, and don’t forecast the value of design
decisions well even if those decisions couldn’t be improved with a better model. Over-
all, modeling heterogeneity in the screening rules used to form consideration sets captures
more value to design than modeling heterogeneity in the compensatory stage. A similar
observation has been made by Andrews et al. [29]. Finally, while assuming that better
model predictive power implies better design decisions is reasonable, it is not necessarily
true: models with lower predictive power can suggest more profitable designs. We hope
our case study will motivate market systems researchers to further examine what consider-
ation behaviors exist in their product categories and how these behaviors might influence
optimality of chosen designs.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the consider-then-choose
model construction and estimation studied in marketing research. Section 3 describes the
simulation framework and synthetic data generation process. Section 4 and 5 respectively
provides details of model estimation and design optimization. Section 6 presents our results,
followed by discussion in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. CONSIDER-THEN-CHOOSE MODELS
A consider-then-choose model can be described as follows. Suppose the universal choice
set is J = {1, ..., J}. A consideration set indexed by r = 1, ..., R, denoted as Cr ⊂ {1, . . . , J}
is defined by a set of screening rules sr = [sr,1, ..., sr,Lr ]. For conjunctive rules, Cr can be
written as:
(1) Cr(X,p) =
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , J} : sr(xj , pj) ≤ 0
}
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The screening rules depend on product features xj , price pj as well as other rule-specific
parameters. This definition means that a product needs to satisfy all the screening rules
to be a member in the corresponding consideration set. For example, the consideration set
Cr(X,p) ={all vehicles j with price pj under $20,000
AND fuel economy ej over 30 mpg}
can be defined by
sr(xj , pj) =
(
pj − 20, 000
30− ej
)
≤ 0.
This structure is consistent with the forms used in the marketing literature, although
marketers often define screening rules in terms of indicators instead of inequalities. See,
for example [23, 36, 32]. These representations can be transformed into the structure
presented here.
Given a collection of screening rules and the associated consideration set, let the condi-
tional probability that product j is chosen within the set be Pj|Cr and let the probability
that the consideration set Cr is formed be PCr . Then the choice probability Pj can be
written as a weighted sum of the choice probabilities across all possible consideration sets:
(2) Pj =
∑
r
Pj|CrPCr
Hauser [22] calls such models “consideration” or “choice set explosion” models, as they are
subject to combinatorial explosion in the number of parameters needed to capture consid-
eration set occurrence. Empirical methods estimate PCr directly, rather than uncovering
structure behind screening by identifying the rules sr. Manrai and Andrews [37] provide
a thorough review of studies applying Eqn. (2) to scanner panel data. Note that Eqn. (2)
can also be considered a type of random coefficients (Mixed) Logit model, though not one
with normally distributed coefficients. This structure has also been found to be similar to
a nested Logit model, as we detail in Sec. 4.5 below.
Preference-conditional choice probabilities then take the following form:
(3) Pj|Cr(X,p | θ) =

eu(xj ,pj ,θ)
1 +
∑
k∈Cr e
u(xk,pk,θ)
if j ∈ Cr
0 if j /∈ Cr
where utility u(.) is a function of product characteristics xj and price pj given coefficients
θ that measure preferences. The utility coefficients θ can be assumed to be homogeneous
across the population or take a random coefficients form to include heterogeneity (which
requires a Monte-Carlo integral of the simple Logit form above). This formula can, in
principle, be extended to capture heterogeneity across consideration sets by allowing a
nontrivial joint distribution between coefficients θ and consideration sets.
Methods used in early studies to discover non-compensatory screening rules included
tracing and protocol analysis [11, 38] in which respondents’ decision processes were self-
reported or tracked. Shortcomings of this type of method have been reported and include
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Table 1. Recent consider-then-choose models constructed from stated
preference data, compared to compensatory models estimated in the same
study. Abbreviations: HB - Hierachical Bayes; MLE - Maximum Likelihood;
HR - “hit rate” (frequency of correct prediction on hold-out samples); KLD
- Kullback-Liebler Divergence; TAU - Kendall’s Tau [42].
% Improvement
Reference Product Compensatory Model Consider-then-Choose Model HR KLD TAU
[33] Laptops LP Logit Greedy, Lexicographic 0%
[24] Batteries MLE Logit MLE, Subset conjunctive 1.1%
[18] Cameras HB Logit HB, Conjunctive screening 7.1%
[26] Smartphones HB Ranked Logit Lexicographic by aspects 8.7%
[25] Cellphones HB Logit Unstructured Direct Elicitation 9.1%
[43] Rental Cars MLE Logit “Cut-off rules” (conjunctions) 14.0%(a)
[44] GPS Units HB Logit Greedy, Lexicographic 4.5% 54.5%
[32] Vehicles HB Logit Adaptive question HB 44.1% 16.7%
(a) [43] characterized improvement with improvement in log-likelihood, which is proportional to KLD.
inconsistencies between the stated screening criteria and observed choices from the same in-
dividual [39]. More recent research shows that the accuracy of direct elicitation approaches
can be improved by designing experiments that are incentive-compatible: for example, by
participating in a survey in which respondents describe their screening rules for new vehi-
cles, they have a decent chance of actually winning a vehicle described [25]. Estimation tools
that are widely applied in traditional discrete choice analysis, e.g. maximum likelihood
and Bayesian methods, can also be used in non-compensatory model parameter estimation
[40, 24, 23]. These methods may, however, suffer from high computation costs due to ex-
ponential growth in the number of possible consideration sets as the number of attributes
and/or attribute levels grows. Machine learning techniques have recently been adapted to
circumvent this problem by applying greedoid methods [26, 33] or low-dimensional param-
eterizations of screening rule likelihood [41, 32]. Broadly speaking, marketing research has
demonstrated predictive power improvement by modeling consideration; see Table 1.
In principle the specification reviewed above can be estimated from choice data with
classical tools such as Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and Bayesian methods. To
facilitate this, the representation of consideration set probability PCr has taken different
forms. Swait [45] introduced a random component into the screening rules so that with an
assumed distribution PCr can be derived based on the probability any alternative is accept-
able. Ben-Akiva [46] extended this random consideration set generation model by specifying
the availability probability as Logit form. Instead of defining PCr through parameterized
screening rules, Chiang et al. [47] assumed consideration set probabilities have a Dirichlet
distribution across the population. Gilbride and Allenby [23] avoided the enumeration of
consideration sets by using a reduced form choice probability and Markov Chain Monte-
Carlo methods to sample from the posterior distribution of the allowable screening criteria
values. Exponential growth in the number of possible consideration sets and rules makes
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consider-then-choose models difficult to estimate in practice. This challenge motivated re-
searchers to develop methods that apply to “consider” stage observations to infer screening
rules with more attributes and complexity. For example, MLE methods have been used
on “acceptable/unacceptable” responses to the profiles to estimate the probability that a
particular attribute level is acceptable [24]. Dzyabura & Hauser [32] model a case where
capturing the distribution of screening rules would require 253 parameters, too many for a
direct estimation strategy. They develop an adaptive question survey strategy to estimate
conjunctive screening rules by parameterizing screening rule likelihood presuming feature
acceptability is independent, obtaining a model with only 53 parameters per respondent.
3. CASE STUDY: VEHICLE DESIGN UNDER BODY STYLE SCREENING
We simulate a stylized model of the new vehicle market with potential purchasers that
screen over vehicle body style. Empirical studies have shown body style screening in
both self-reported surveys [48] and statistical inferences [32]. Body style also significantly
impacts the engineering relationships between other features in vehicle design. We often
refer to the synthetic behavior described below as the “true” behavior. We do not use this
terminology to suggest this is how households actually choose new vehicles. This is only a
shorthand appropriate for the context of the simulation experiment.
3.1. Synthetic Behavior. Our population is a mix of groups that screen over B = 9
vehicle body styles listed in Table 2. Vehicles are described by fuel economy (e), acceleration
(a), price (p) and a B-element binary vector δ for which δb = 1 if, and only if, the vehicle
has body style b (thus
∑
b δb = 1). Let s 6= 0 be a B-element binary vector defining which
body styles are “acceptable” to a given individual in the population; we refer to these
vectors succinctly as “screening rules.” Unlike δ, which can have only one element equal
to 1, s can have any number of elements equal to 1. An individual with screening rule s
considers only those vehicles with body styles b such that sb = 1 or, equivalently, s
>δ ≥ 1.
In the notation of Eqn. (1,3) we can index individuals by screening rules s and define
(4) Cs(4) =
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , J} : 1− s>δj ≤ 0
}
where 4 = (δ1, . . . , δJ) is a matrix of binary body style vectors.
The fraction of individuals in the population with a particular screening rule s is given
by a probability mass function α(s) drawn from the results of the empirical study reported
in [41, 32]. This study estimated conjunctive screening rules with a Bayesian adaptive
question method for 874 respondents. More specifically, we take α to be the empirical
frequency distribution (over respondents) of the modal (most probable) rules s for the
posterior distribution. Out of the 874 respondents, 219 distinct most-probable conjunctive
screening rules were estimated, and every body style is acceptable to some individual. See
Table 2 for the aggregated acceptability of different body styles over the full respondent
pool.
SHOULD OPTIMAL DESIGNERS WORRY ABOUT CONSIDERATION? 7
Table 2. Percentage of respondents accepting the given body style, as
reported in [32].
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Table 3. Means and Variances of random coefficients (θˆ’s) in synthetic
population utility function, Eqn. (5). N (µˆ, σˆ) refers to a normally dis-
tributed variable with mean µˆ and variance σˆ2. Values based on the model
from [49].
Random Coefficient
Attribute Utility Mean (µˆ) Variance (σˆ)
Price (p) − exp{N (µˆ, σˆ)}p 2.0 0.1
Fuel Economy (a) N (µˆ, σˆ)/e −36.8 2.2
Acceleration (e) N (µˆ, σˆ)/a 11.3 0.3
Constant (−) N (µˆ, σˆ) −23.2 0.5
Conditional on using a screening rule s, individuals choose from those vehicles in Cs(4)
by maximizing the random utility:
Uj = uˆ(ej , aj , pj ; θˆ) + Ej(5)
uˆ(e, a, p; θˆ) = − exp{θˆp}p+ θˆe
e
+
θˆa
a
+ θˆ0(6)
for random coefficients θˆl ∼ N (µˆl, σˆl) (l = p, e, a, 0). N (µˆ, σˆ) is the normal distribution
with mean µˆ and variance σˆ. The exponential in the price coefficient ensures that lower
prices are preferred, all other things being equal. The errors E = (E0, E1, . . . , EJ) are i.i.d.
extreme value variables mean-shifted towards zero. The resulting screening-conditional
sub-populations thus follow a Mixed Logit model. There are no correlations between
screening rules and preference over vehicle attributes and price, but there is heterogeneity
in the population.
3.2. Market Share Simulation. We simulate sales data set that might be collected from
multiple, separate new vehicle markets. The vehicles in each market form a “universal”
choice set for the consumers in that market. A data set for estimation then consists
of vehicle market shares in M separate markets indexed by m. For each market, we
draw a set of Jm vehicles, denoted Jm. The profile of vehicle j in market m is given by
drawing fuel economy (ej,m), acceleration (aj,m), price (pj,m) and body style (bj,m) from
8 MINHUA LONG AND W. ROSS MORROW
a uniform distribution respectively on intervals [5, 50] (mpg), [2, 15] (s) and [10, 60] (10k$)
and {1, . . . , B}. An alternative consistent with our optimal design problem presented
below would be to draw sets of vehicles that satisfy our assumed design constraints. This
is possible, and better matches the stylized market modeling paradigm we employ. However
random draws are likely to give us better information about choice behavior than correlated
draws, and thus allow us to focus more completely on choice model quality. To investigate
statistical properties of model estimation and use with stochastic data generation and
choice outcomes, this process is repeated with different random seeds.
Given product profiles in market m, we draw Nm choice observations in which individ-
uals can purchase one of the vehicles or choose not to purchase any vehicle (choose the
“outside good”). Nm individuals are drawn from the synthetic population by drawing Nm
screening rules si from the distribution α(s) along with associated random coefficients θi.
Shares Sj,m for each vehicle j in each market m (and the outside good) are then gener-
ated by maximizing random utilities (utilities plus error term) foreach individual over their
consideration set. See [50] for an explicit algorithm.
4. CHOICE MODELS
We examine four choice model specifications: Multinomial Logit (MNL), Random Coef-
ficients Logit (RCL), Nested Multinomial Logit (NML) and Consider-Then-Choose Logit
(CTC) models. We assume that all models incorporate the prior information that body
style plays a role in consumer decision, but different model specifications incorporate this
piece of information in different structures: MNL and RCL model assume the tradeoffs
between body style and other attributes, NML uses nests that separate body styles, thus
constructing a two-stage but yet compensatory process; CTC models the frequency of any
possible consideration sets, based on body style, along with compensatory choices con-
ditional on consideration set. Note that the true behavior of the synthetic population
exhibits characteristics of both non-compensatory screening and heterogeneity in compen-
satory stage. Thus all the models are misspecified on at least one behavioral feature. The
comparison between these models will thus illustrate the consequence of failing to capture
different behavioral features.
Coefficients in all models are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood with respect
to the coefficients [2]. For a general choice model with probabilities Pj,m(θ) for coefficients
θ, this takes the form:
(7)
maximize
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈Jm∪{0}
Sj,m log
(
Pj,m(θ)
)
with respect to θ (plus possible constraints)
We abbreviate this process by “MLE” and, for brevity, do not explicitly list each MLE
problem below. Instead we define the choice probability model and list any constraints
imposed on the coefficients as this is sufficient to recreate our process.
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4.1. Multinomial Logit Model (MNL). The MNL model takes the utility of product
j to be
(8) uMNLj,m (θ) = − exp{θp}pj,m +
θe
ej,m
+
θa
aj,m
+
B∑
b=1
θbδj,m,b + θ0
giving choice probabilities
(9) PMNLj,m (θ) =
exp{uMNLj,m (θ)}
1 +
∑
k∈Jm exp{uMNLk,m (θ)}
As with the true behavior, the “exp” term in the price coefficient ensures that the price
coefficient is negative, and thus lower prices are preferred (all other attributes being equal).
The “no buy” or outside good probability is PMNL0,m (θ) = 1−
∑
j∈Jm P
MNL
j,m (θ). The body
style coefficients are not independently identified from the constant θ0 because body styles
are represented by dummies that always sum to one. We use “effects coding” [51] and
constrain the coefficients over body styles to sum to zero. We could, equivalently, leave
the constant term or one of the body style dummies out of the specification. We prefer to
include the constant and all dummies with effects coding as this allows us to capture only
body style specific variations in utility with the coefficients on the body style dummies.
4.2. Random Coefficients Logit Model (RCL). In the RCL model, choice probabili-
ties PRCLj,m are defined for each vehicle j in each market m by
(10) PRCLj,m (µ,σ) =
∫
PMNLj,m (θ)φ(θ | µ,σ)dθ
for PMNLj,m as given in Eqn. (9). All random coefficients as written in Eqns. (9-10) are
assumed to be normally distributed, θl = N (µl, σl) l = p, a, e, 1, ..., B, with mean µI and
variance σ2I . Note, however, that this implies that the price coefficient will be log-normal
(e.g., [52, 53]). The density φ is thus a product of 4+B independent normal densities each
having two parameters. The RCL model thus has 8 + 2B coefficients we must estimate,
two of which enter into the utility function nonlinearly.
Given synthetic revealed preference data we estimate the parameters (µ,σ) using sim-
ulated MLE [2]. We perform Monte-Carlo sampling over random coefficients to obtain I
samples θi ∼ N (µ,diag(σ2)) and simulated RCL choice probabilities
(11) P˜RCLj,m (µ,σ) =
(
1
I
) I∑
i=1
PMNLj,m (θi).
We use I = 1, 000 Monte-Carlo samples throughout this study if not otherwise mentioned.
Similar to the Logit model estimation, the perfect correlation between body style coeffi-
cients can lead to multiple estimators that give the same choice probability. Therefore the
mean coefficients on body styles are also constrained so that their sum equals to zero. Note
that this does not imply that
∑
b θb = 0 with probability one, but only that E[
∑
b θb] = 0.
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4.3. Nested Multinomial Logit Model (NML). We also examine a NML model in
which vehicles with the same body style are assigned to the same nest. Suppose product
j in market m belongs to nest Nb(j),m where b(j) is the body style of product j. The
probability product j is chosen in market m is
(12) PNMLj,m (θ) = Pj|b(j),mPb(j),m
where PNb,m is the probability that any product from nest Nb is chosen in market m and
PCj|b(j),m is the probability that product j is chosen in market m, conditional on nest b(j)
being chosen. PCj|b(j),m follows the logit formula in which only non-body style features are
involved in the utility:
(13) PCj|b(j),m(θ) =
exp{uNMLj,m (θp, θe, θp)}∑
k∈Nb(j),m exp{uNMLk,m (θp, θe, θa)}
with utility within the nest defined as:
(14) uNMLj,m (θp, θe, θa) = − exp{θp}pj,m +
θe
ej,m
+
θa
aj,m
The choice of nest depends on the “nest utility”
(15) Vb,m(θp, θe, θa) = log
 ∑
j∈Nb,m
exp{uNMLj,m (θp, θe, θa)}

and also takes the logit form
(16) PNb,m(θ,λ) =
exp{θ0 + θb + λbVb,m(θp, θe, θa)}
1 +
∑B
c=1 exp{θ0 + θc + λcVc,m(θp, θe, θa)}
We again constraint the body style dummies coefficient to sum to zero, for the same reason
as in MNL and RCL models.
This formulation follows Daly’s version of the NML [54], rather than the “Generalized
Extreme Value” formulation given by McFadden [55]. The difference between two formu-
lations is that McFadden’s model uses
θ0 + θb + λbVb,m
(
θp
λb
,
θe
λb
,
θa
λb
)
as the utility in Eqn. (16). This change is required for consistency with random utility
maximization, but there is still debate about whether that is essential in the model [2].
Both versions have similarities with consideration behavior, as discussed below.
4.4. Consider-Then-Choose Logit Model (CTC). In the CTC model body styles are
screened in the non-compensatory stage and do not enter the compensatory stage. Pref-
erence in compensatory stage is assumed to be homogeneous both among the population
and across all consideration sets. The body styles screening rules are S = (s1, ..., sR) char-
acterizing all R = 2B − 1 possible consideration sets C1, ..., CR, except the “null set” in
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which no body style is considered. Each screening rule is coded as B-element binary vector
sr = (sr,1, ..., sr,B) where sr,b = 1 if body style b is acceptable, sr,b = 0 otherwise. Thus
(17) Cr,m = {j : s>r δj,m ≥ 1}
which means that a product will be considered as long as its body style is acceptable.
The choice probability for product j in market m is
(18) PCTCj,m (θ,α) =
R∑
r=1
αr
(
exp{uCTCj,m (θ)}
1 +
∑
k∈Cr,m exp{uCTCk,m (θ)}
)
if j ∈ Cr,m and zero otherwise, where αr = α(sr) is an estimator of the probability that a
randomly drawn individual in the population has screening rule sr and utilities are defined
by:
(19) uCTCj,m (θ) = − exp{θp}pj,m +
θe
ej,m
+
θa
aj,m
+ θ0
We estimate this model with MLE, solving for both θ and α ∈ [0,1], ∑r αr = 1. These
constraints are required to ensure that α is a probability mass function.
Note that we directly estimate consideration set probability PCr = α(sr) rather than
estimating parameters of the distribution α(s). Our case study is small enough to enable us
to enumerate the consideration sets, requiring only R = 511 α values to fully characterize
the distribution of consideration sets. This formulation allows us to estimate from the
same observed market share data using a MLE technique consistent with that employed
for the MNL, RCL, and NML models. The CTC model we estimate does not, however,
then reflect the level of generality and efficiency available in the applications we review
above. This does not affect our main purpose, to demonstrate the impact on design of
non-compensatory behavior.
4.5. Connecting Nested Logit with Consideration. A few comments regarding the
connection between the NML and CTC models are required, motivated by the similarity in
the choice probabilities in the CTC and NML models. If the consideration sets used in the
population are disjoint, then Eqn. (2) describes the choice probabilities in a single-level
nested Logit model whose nests are given by the consideration sets. However a NML would
use the specific parameterization of PCr given in Eqn. (16). It is easy to see that any true
value of PCr can be recovered in this parameterization by taking the nesting parameter
λr to be 1 and choosing the right value of the coefficients for attributes that are constant
over the consideration set (e.g., body style). Swait [56] has linked the generalized nested
logit model to construct a general consideration set explosion model. Similarly, it is also
easy to show that a single-level cross-nested Logit model [57] can realize choice processes
as described in Eqn. (2).
Though these models are the mathematically similar their interpretations differ, which
drives a non-trivial difference in formalization. The NML model pictures rational, com-
pensatory individuals that might use any consideration set and choose any product, and
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models consideration set frequency as a function of the expected maximum utility of choos-
ing from a given consideration set [2]. While a NML can recover CTC behavior choosing the
right parameters, it does not necessarily result in the same predictions as designs change
because nest selection is a function of in-nest utilities. In contrast, the CTC model views
individuals as drawn from a population with heterogeneous screening rules, and decouples
consideration set frequency from utility. When consideration set occurrence is, completely
or partially, independent of compensatory utilities, this distinction is meaningful.
5. DESIGN OPTIMIZATION
This section defines a single firm’s optimal vehicle design problem matching the stylized
market model discussed above. The firm’s objective is to maximize the expected profit of
its vehicle portfolio by deciding the number of vehicles Jf and choosing the body style, fuel
economy, acceleration, and price for each vehicle. We allow firms to offer multiple vehicles
of the same body style, as this is observed in real auto markets.
5.1. Engineering Model. Each vehicle is described by its 0-60 acceleration time (a, in
s), fuel economy (e, in mpg), weight (w, 103 lbs), body style (b ∈ {1, . . . , B}), “technology
content” (t, unitless), and price (p, $104). In the original model by [49], t is a continu-
ous proxy for efficiency improvement through adoption of discrete technology content; this
efficiency improvement can be directed towards either fuel economy or acceleration perfor-
mance. To accomplish this, and to represent a physical connection between acceleration
and fuel economy, e, a, w and t are related by a function gb(e, a, t) as given in Eqn. (20):
(20)
gb(e, a, t) =
1000
e− 3.46 − β
g
const(b)− βga(b) exp{−a} − βgt (b)t
− βgat(b)a2t− βgw(b)w − βgwa(b)wa
Eqn. (20) can be written as an equality constraint gb(e, a, t) = 0 on acceleration and fuel
economy decisions. Unit costs are also a function of design variables expressed by the
following function:
(21)
cb(e, a) = β
c
const(b) + β
c
a(b) exp{−a}+ βct (b)t
+ βcw(b)w + β
c
wa(b)wa
the body style specific coefficients in these models were estimated using detailed engineering
simulations from AVL Cruise in conjunction with confidential technology production cost
data provided to NHTSA by automakers in advance of the 2012− 2016 fuel economy rule
making [49]. Table ?? and ?? summarizes body style specific coefficient values. In our case
study we assume that vehicle weight and technology content for each vehicle are fixed, and
thus do not include these as arguments in gb or cb. We use the average curb weights listed
in Table ??, based on 2005 model year vehicle data as reported in [58], and technology
content tb = 20.
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5.2. Formulation and Solution. Given a portfolio with Jf vehicles and body style vector
b the optimal choices of fuel economy, acceleration, and price for each vehicle are those
that solve
(22)
maximize pi(p, e,a|Jf ,b)
with respect to ∀j, pj ≥ 0
Le,b(j) ≤ ej ≤ Ue,b(j),
La,b(j) ≤ aj ≤ Ua,b(j),
subject to gb(j)(ej , aj) = 0 ∀j
where expected profits are
(23) pi(p, e,a|Jf ,b) =
Jf∑
j=1
Pj(p, e,a,b)(pj − cj(ej , aj))
and (Le,b, Ue,b), (La,b, Ua,b) are body-style specific lower and upper bounds on fuel economy
and acceleration. Note that we are not specific about what probability model we use.
Eqn. (22) is smooth for any of the models, because choosing prices, fuel economy, and
acceleration does not affect screening in the CTC or, similarly, the nesting structure in
NML.
The optimal number of vehicles, body styles, and associated designs and prices can be
obtained by solving
(24)
maximize pi∗(Jf ,b)
with respect to Jf ∈ {1, . . . , B},
bj ∈ {1, . . . , B} for all j = 1, ..., Jf
where pi∗(Jf ,b) is the optimal value of Eqn. (22) for given Jf and b. Note that we allow
for multiple vehicles with the same body style. Because enumerating all all the feasible
choices of body styles b for 1, . . . , B vehicles is computationally prohibitive, we use a
Genetic Algorithm (GA) to solve Eqn. (24); our scheme is described in Appendix ??.
6. RESULTS
This section presents performance results pertaining to choice model accuracy or predic-
tive power, design “error”, and profitability potential. To investigate how the amount of
market information influences performance, we performed the simulation experiment with
M = 10, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1000 markets. For each M we draw 20 separate sets of
Jm = 5 profiles and Nm = 100 choice observations, estimate MNL, RCL, NML, and CTC
models, and then use these models to design product portfolios obtaining 20 separate sets
of model estimates and designs. Sampling different sets of share data for a given market
size allows us to gauge the effect of sampling variance in the data on model predictions,
design outcomes, and design value, while examining different numbers of markets allows us
to assess the asymptotic properties of the estimated models and their associated designs.
The MLE and design optimization routines were programmed in C language, and nonlinear
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programs involved in estimation and design optimization were solved with the sequential
quadratic programming (SQP) solver SNOPT (version 7) [59]. All computations were un-
dertaken on a single Mac Pro tower with 2, quad-core 2.26GHz processors and 32GB of
RAM running OS X (10.6.8).
6.1. Predictive Power. The predictive power of the estimated models is validated on a
new data set that consists of M ′ markets, where each market m′ = 1, ...,M ′ has a set of
vehicles Jm′ . Kullback-Leibler Divergence [60],
(25) KLD =
(
1
M ′
) M ′∑
m′=1
∑
j∈Jm′
P Tj,m′ log
(
P Tj,m′
Pj,m′
)
,
captures how close the predicted choice probability distribution P is to the actual choice
probability distribution P T in the validation set. Predictive share errors are evaluated via
Eqn. (25) using 1,000 markets of validation data different from the estimation data, but
drawn using the same approach.
Fig. 1 plots the divergence between predictions for estimated models and the true be-
havior against the number of markets used to train the models. Increasing the amount of
market data available for estimation reduces both expected prediction error and the vari-
ance of the error. Increasing the amount of data, however, does not result in traditional
compensatory models that match the predictive power of the CTC model. For example,
the divergence of the three traditional models’ predictions observing 1000 markets is larger
than the CTC prediction observing only 10 markets. When observing more than 50 mar-
kets, the predictive power of RCL and NML models is generally between those of MNL and
CTC with RCL predictions appearing to be slightly closer to the true behavior. However,
when observing fewer than 10 markets the MNL model outperforms RCL and NML mod-
els. We believe designers should be particularly interested in performance when estimating
models with relatively small amount of market data because real revealed preference mar-
ket research often uses a very limited number of markets for estimation. For example,
econometric new vehicle market models most often use fewer than 20 markets (marked
with vertical line in Fig. 1) [61, 62, 63, 2]. Our market simulation setting is not strictly
comparable to these studies because of a difference in the number of vehicle-observations
in each market, the complexity of real vehicle profiles, and the detail often given by popu-
lation demographics. But these results suggest caution given the small number of markets
usually used for model estimation in practice.
6.2. Decision Bias and Variance. We first define a “design error” metric to quantify
how different portfolios chosen using an estimated model are from portfolios that would
be chosen for the true behavior (perfect information). Comparing product portfolios is a
complicated task, and we do not suggest we have a uniquely good metric for comparison.
Essentially, our metric compares the relative difference in specific vehicle attributes −
excluding price to focus on engineering aspects of strategy − for the same styles of vehicles
and number of vehicles with different body styles. The specific numerical values of “design
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Figure 1. Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) of predicted choice prob-
ability distribution from true behavior. Solid lines represent the range of
observed values over 20 separate data sets while the dashed line represents
the average value.
error” for any given choice model are less important than comparisons across the different
choice model types we explore.
Suppose a portfolio has Jf vehicles, each with body style bj and design xj = (ej , aj).
Denote the body style combinations of a portfolio as (n1, n2, ..., nB) where nb is the number
of vehicles in the portfolio that have body style b. We refer to the ideal portfolio as an
estimate of the globally optimal portfolio with the true behavior and denote the ideal
portfolio with superscript “*”; multiplicity of ideal portfolios is addressed below. Our
design error metric is
(26) d =
1
2
(
B∑
b=1
Nb + max{H+, H−}
)
where
Nb =
{ |nb − n∗b |/n∗b if n∗b > 0
nb if n
∗
b = 0
(27)
H+ = max
j:n∗
b(j)
>0
{
min
k:b∗(k)=b(j)
{
dw(xj ,x
∗
k)
}}
(28)
H− = max
j:nb(k)>0
{
min
j:b(j)=b∗(k)
{
dw(xj ,x
∗
k)
}}
(29)
dw(x,x
∗) =
1
2
( |e− e∗|
e∗
+
|a− a∗|
a∗
)
(30)
The first term in Eqn. (26), Eqn. (27), captures differences in body style combinations by
penalizing differences in the number of vehicles offered with each body style. The second
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Figure 2. Design error, measured as in Eqn. (26), for all models over all
numbers of markets observed. Solid lines represent the range of observed
values over 20 separate data sets while the dashed line represents the average
value.
term in Eqn. (26), composed of Eqns. (28-30), is a Hausdorff distance [64] comparing sets
of vehicles with the same body styles using the relative error metric in Eqn. (30). This
portion of the metric is zero so long as the sets of vehicles offered are equivalent, even if
offered in different multiplicities. If nonzero, this portion gives the relative error in the
attributes of any vehicle offered when that vehicle shares a body style with a body style
offered in the ideally optimal portfolio. Note that this distance measure gives an error only
in engineering decisions, while pricing is obviously important to profitable product design.
However it is plausible that “incorrect” prices could be corrected relatively quickly in the
marketplace after offering a particular set of products, while errors in engineering features
cannot be. Section 6.4 explores this in more detail. See [50] for a generalization of Eqn.
(26)-(30) that accounts for prices.
Fig. 2 plots design error for optimal decisions based on the MNL, RCL, NML, and CTC
choice models against number of markets observed. Two features are of interest: design
bias refers to the difference between mean model-optimal designs and ideal optimal designs;
design variance refers to the spread of designs that might be made given different observed
markets used to estimate the choice models. With fewer than 25 markets the CTC model
has the lowest design bias, consistent with the performance this model showed in predictive
power. As the amount of market data grows, designs under the CTC model appear to be
converging to ideal designs. Designs chosen using a NML model compare well to CTC
designs when observing 50 or more markets. Designs chosen using a RCL model have the
largest variation among the models, and this variation cannot be overcome by increasing
the number of markets observed. Unlike RCL, NML and CTC models, using a MNL model
suggests identical vehicles with the same body style should be produced; this is reflected as
the high design error compared to the ideal design in which there is wide diversity among
body styles.
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In computing design error we presume that a computed ideal portfolio is a good repre-
sentation of portfolios required to achieve global optimality relative to the true behavior.
If there are distinct locally optimal portfolios that achieve nearly globally optimal profits a
different metric would be required. Similarly, if profits were “flat” near the ideal portfolio
design error loses meaning. In the next section we discuss decision profitability, which is
the ultimate metric of portfolio performance.
However, an important issue in our use of this metric pertains to whether our “ideal”
optimal designs are a good representation of the global optimum. Given suitable evolution
rules, GAs can explore the entire design space and thus global optimality is guaranteed for
discrete variable problems, but only because the design space can be enumerated; global
optimality cannot be guaranteed in finite time, with probability one, for continuous variable
problems. In our case, we applied a GA to a relatively small, B(B+1) = 90 binary variable
problem, evolving populations for 50-100 generations (until the best and average fitness
values converged), and used 50 trial-multistart. Given the small size of design space, this
process is very likely to obtain good solutions. We found a high degree of consistency in
both the body type combinations obtained by the GA and the design and price for each
body type found by the NLP; in terms of our own design metric, the optimal solutions
found by multistart differed by less than 10−6. Thus we have high confidence that our
computed ideal optimal designs are as good as could be practically obtained.
6.3. Decision Profitability. A decision that differs from an ideal decision is not neces-
sarily un-profitable. The true profit of a product portfolio is its expected profits computed
under the true behavior, rather than the estimated model. We compute true profit Π as
(31) Π =
Jf∑
j=1
P Tj (e,a,p,4)(pj − cj)
computing market share P Tj by computing the choice probability in the true behavior
described in Section 3.1 instead of the sampling procedure described in Section 3.2. Here the
Monte-Carlo sampling size used to approximate the compensatory stage random coefficients
model was I = 100, 000. We do not include competitive firms’ vehicles in this profit
validation in order to be consistent with the design optimization problems, which do not
include competition. Note that true profit for any model-optimal portfolio should be less
than the true profit given by the optimal portfolio under the true behavior. We refer the
the profit gained by optimal decisions under the true model as the ideal profit.
Fig. 3 plots the percentage of ideal profits that can be achieved by choosing designs and
prices using an estimated model. CTC designs and prices are, not surprisingly, best able
to capture true profits. Even when observing only 10 markets, CTC designs and prices can
be expected to achieved at least 90% of the ideal profits with the worst designs achieving
around 70% of the ideal profits. MNL designs and prices can be expected to obtain only
60% of the ideal profit due to a single body-style portfolio that lacks diversity. Estimating
a model with limited amount of market data appears to affect the profitability of the RCL
model designs the most out of all the models, consistent with our observations regarding
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design error variance. Even observing up to 50 markets it is possible for RCL designs and
prices to recover less than 40% of the ideal profits, depending on sampling variance in
the market data. More data results in RCL designs and prices within 90-95% of the ideal
profits. Observing less than 25 markets NML designs capture approximately 20% less true
profit than the CTC designs and also shows relatively high variation in true profits (facts
obscured by the log10-scale axis in Fig. 3). However like RCL, NML designs and prices
can ultimately capture 90-95% of the true ideal profits when estimating the model with
enough data.
6.4. Pricing-On-Offering. An additional test assesses the degree to which a model sug-
gests unprofitable decisions simply because of a poor representation of preferences over
prices. Prices can, in principle, be changed up until the point-of-sale while design decisions
must often be fixed far in advance of sale. Thus it is reasonable to consider a case where
firms learn more about preferences when they offer the portfolio designed and exercise
price flexibility to maximize profits. Suppose that the MNL, RCL, NML, and CTC models
inform the design of the product portfolio but that prices can be changed even the product
is offered (as in, e.g., [65]). How much more profits could the firm recover by using the true
choice behavior in order to set optimal prices, for fixed designs? While the firm is not likely
to actually know the true behavior, this value represents an upper bound on profitability
of design decisions made using an estimated model when prices are flexible and determined
when offering the portfolio.
Fig. 4 plots percent of ideal profits obtained using the vehicle portfolios suggested by
the estimated models, but offered at prices determined by the optimizing profits for that
portfolio under the true behavior. From this perspective the RCL, NML, and CTC models
each have the potential to suggest nearly equivalently profitable design decisions. RCL
and NML, in particular, can suggest much more profitable portfolios if we admit pricing
flexibility than if we dont, and thus RCL and NML capture pricing preferences more weakly
than does the CTC model. Moreover, for intermediate numbers of markets (25, 50, 100,
and 200), the NML model appears to suggest the most profitable portfolios by a small
margin (less than 2.7%) that is exaggerated by the log10 axis scaling. Finally, even the
best possible pricing strategy cannot increase the true profitability of the single body-style
portfolio designed under the MNL model.
7. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
There are several observations for designers to take away from this exploratory simulation
study.
First, conventional compensatory models can reasonably support profitable design de-
cisions even when the population exhibits non-compensatory behavior with enough data.
Designs based on estimated RCL and NML models were capable of obtaining above 90%
of the ideal profits (Fig. 3); however this required roughly twice the amount of market
data (50 markets) that might typically be available (20 markets) judging from the vehicle
modeling literature. The RCL and NML models could suggest designs that obtain almost
100% when an ideal pricing strategy is followed (Fig. 4), but this would require learning
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preferences exactly when actually offering the vehicles designed (Fig. 4). This is practically
impossible but does suggest that a significant portion of the “error” made with conventional
models pertains to pricing bias, not design bias. However designers should be aware of the
possible side effects of different compensatory model structures: The MNL model suggests
portfolios with identical body styles; the RCL model, estimated on limited amounts of
aggregate market share data, is highly sensitive to sample error leading to large variations
in optimal designs; and the NML model, while it might capture optimal designs very well
if the nesting structure reflects consideration, suggests biased pricing decisions and thus
cannot present accurate forecasts of design profitability. Designers also need to take into
account the amount of information available to train their model when they decide what
model to use. According to our simulation using the MNL might be more reliably profitable
than using the RCL and NML models if market data are very limited, because noise in the
data induces greater variance in designs suggested by RCL and NML models.
Second, modeling the heterogeneity in the screening rules may capture more value to
design than modeling heterogeneity in the compensatory stage. This is most directly
observed by comparing the CTC and RCL models. The RCL model ignores screening
stage heterogeneity, and achieved only 30% of the ideal profit (on average) with 10 markets
while displaying an unacceptably large sensitivity to sample variance with limited training
data. The CTC model with only 10 markets of training data gives a firm expected profit
that is at least 80% as much as what they could get with perfect knowledge. Recall
that the CTC model is mis-specified, in that it ignores compensatory stage heterogeneity.
Other evidence comes from the NML. NML and CTC are similar in a two-stage modeling
structure. In effect, our NML is a close approximation to a CTC model assuming that
individuals consider one, and only one, vehicle body style. Decisions made based on the
NML are most often more profitably than those made with the RCL model for all amounts
of training data. This observation may be driven by limited amount of heterogeneity in
our assumed true behavior (see Table 3), suggesting further research is required.
Note also that the CTC model has the potential to be seriously overfit. For example, the
CTC model in with M = 50 has more than twice as many parameters (515) as observations
(250), but is still the most predictively accurate model (Fig. 1, right) and results in the
most profitable decisions (Fig. 3, right). Conventional wisdom would suggest that at least
as many observations as parameters are required for a valid model; i.e., the CTC model
requires, at a minimum, M 103 markets with 5 vehicles per market. We believe that the
stability of estimated model predictions is more important than the ratio of parameters to
observations; Fig. 1 shows that the predictive power of the estimated CTC model is as
good as it can get with as few as 50 markets. However, overfitting effects may result in
the difference between NML and CTC model performance when pricing on offering (Fig.
4): our CTC model presumes that all 511 screening rules may be in use by the population
generating the data, while the NML approximates a CTC model with only B = 9 screening
rules. Slightly better performance with the simpler model suggests some overfitting may
be occurring, although any such overfitting could be easily corrected by restricting the
number of nonzero α coefficients in the CTC estimation.
SHOULD OPTIMAL DESIGNERS WORRY ABOUT CONSIDERATION? 21
Legend 100%
10%
1%
0.1%
Tr
ue
 P
ro
fit
 E
rr
or
 (%
)
Divergence from True Distribution
10-3 10-2 10-1 100
MNL, M=10
RCL, M=10
CTC, M=10
MNL, M=1000
RCL, M=1000
CTC, M=1000
NML, M=10
NML, M=1000
100
10-1
10-2
10-3
D
es
ig
n 
E
rr
or
 (w
ith
 p
ric
es
)
Divergence from True Distribution
10-3 10-2 10-1 100
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versus Kullback-Leibler divergence of choice prediction. Completely recov-
ery of the ideal profit yields 0% error while zero profit yields 100% error.
Third, assuming that better predictive power indicates better design decisions is reason-
able but not necessarily true. Pearson correlation coefficients are positive but weak: 0.62
between predictive power (divergence) and design error, 0.73 between predictive power and
profit error (measured as error, not percent of ideal profits recovered), and 0.73 between
design and profit errors. Fig. 5 scatters the average design error and average true prof-
itability versus the average Kullback-Leibler divergence of four models estimated under
two market information conditions: 10 and 1,000 markets; Here, the average is taken over
different data sets with the same number of markets. While there is a general trend that
lower divergence (better model predictive power) is consistent with lower design error, de-
viation from this trend is also observed. For example, NML has, on average, worse choice
predictions but better designs than RCL for both 10 and 1,000 markets worth of data.
Lower model divergence also generally indicates less loss of profit. However there are ex-
ceptions, such as the comparison between the NML and the RCL. Note also the difference
in scales: the MNL model does not appear to predict that much worse than the NML or
RCL models while suggesting designs that capture almost no profit relative to NML or
RCL.
These results shows that the true profitability of designs made using traditional models
cannot be judged from predictive power alone. While further investigation of the relation-
ship between predictive accuracy and decision value across a range of design problems and
market conditions is needed, it is clear that choice models with structure representative of
the underlying choice process are better for design even if they may not show significant
benefits from the perspective of modeling choice alone.
Important limitations of our study are as follows.
Our study has focused on the value of incorporating prior knowledge on screening with-
out demonstrating the process needed to obtain that knowledge. Nor has our study exam-
ined the consequences of misspecified prior knowledge. The CTC model in this study is
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able to estimate the distribution of the possible consideration sets from choice data given
that the attributes involved in the screening process are known and limited. Our presumed
behavior−screening over body style−is a reasonable prior for the case study and is rep-
resented in some form in every model we tested. Aggregate share data is insufficient to
infer what attributes and screens are involved in the consideration stage. We are currently
mirroring this simulation study within the context of survey design for both choice-based
conjoint and consideration-based questions [32] in which screening rules can be statistically
inferred. Subjective beliefs, however, often inform choice model construction; they under-
lie decisions about what utility function to use and what distribution the error term takes
(including heterogeneous preferences and nesting structures). While we must assume that
misspecification of screening rules would impact design outcomes, this is a generic problem
for choice modeling.
The design problem in our case study is also simplistic. The engineering model merely
focuses on a body style specific fuel consumption-acceleration relationship and cost function
that depends only on fuel economy and acceleration. The screening rules we used were
independent of continuous features such as price and fuel economy; in contrast, the study
from which we drew screening rules estimated rules over a body style, brand, fuel economy,
price, quality, safety, power, and powertrain [32]. Future studies should include more
engineering model as well as complexities in screening.
Bayesian methods [66] for model estimation were also not used in this study. An impor-
tant fact is that Bayesian methods provide an alternative path to estimate the parameters
of a choice model, not fundamentally different models. Theoretically speaking, maximum
likelihood and Bayesian estimators are often similar; in particular the posterior mean of
a Bayesian estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator
[2]. Empirically Bayesian estimators have been reported to have better fit small-sample
data but have predictive power and parameter recovery similar to maximum likelihood
estimation [67]. In the context of our study we might then expect Bayesian estimators
to achieve larger-sample performance with fewer data, but not to qualitatively change
the comparison between conventional compensatory models and non-compensatory mod-
els when consumers consider.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores the impact of consideration behavior on optimal design for market
systems models. We presented a simulation study of vehicle portfolio design for a popula-
tion with heterogeneous screening over body style and heterogenous compensatory evalua-
tions after screening. With synthetically generated aggregate marketshare data we estimate
multinomial Logit, random coefficient Logit, nested multinomial logit, and consider-then-
choose logit models. All four models contain some representation of screening, and all are
misspecified in at least one dimension of the true behavior. We use the estimated models to
optimize designs for a single model and compare model performance in terms of predictive
power, design error, and profitability. We find that capturing heterogeneous consideration,
when it exists, is more important than capturing heterogeneous tradeoffs. This can be
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accomplished with consider-then-choose Logit, but also with the right nested Logit model.
Decisions made using Logit models are simplistic, suggesting portfolios with a single body
style, and decisions made using random coefficients Logit models are noisy; with limited
amounts of data, Logit models may often lead to more profitable decisions than random
coefficients Logit. We also observe that higher model predictive power generally does im-
ply a more profitable design decision, but that there are cases where poorer predictors can
yield higher profits.
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